Liberal Intergovernmentalism

Liberal Intergovernmentalism What choice for Europe? Reflections on agency and structure in Liberal Intergovernmentalism ABSTRACT This article examines how the relationship between agency and structure is dealt with in Liberal Intergovernmentalism, a prevailing theory of European integration. It demonstrates that, contrary to the widespread view that it is agency-centred, Liberal Intergovernmentalism is in fact a highly structuralist theory in the issue areas it claims to explain best. In these areas integration is ultimately explained in terms of developments in economic structures, leaving no room for agency and ideas. The article also shows that, despite the importance it ascribes to changes in economic structures, Liberal Intergovernmentalism fails to theorise their possible causes. Keywords: Liberal Intergovernmentalism; Moravcsik; Agency; Structure; Integration theory Over the past two decades Andrew Moravcsiks Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI) has established itself as one of the prevailing theories of European integration. Elegantly combining a liberal theory of preference formation with an intergovernmentalist theory of interstate bargains and a functional theory of institutional choice it explains European integration as the outcome of a series of intergovernmental negotiations. More than any other contemporary theory of integration LI and its application in empirical analyses has provoked discussion in the field of EU studies. Opinions are divided between those who admire LI for its parsimony and predictive power and those who feel that its account of regional integration misses out on too much of importance. Either way, hardly anyone would dispute that it continues to be a theory that it is necessary to relate to in one way or another in theoretically informed work on European integration. The purpose of this article is to critically examine the liberal intergovernmentalist explanation of integration from a meta-theoretical perspective. More precisely, it will be systematically analysed how the relationship between agency and structure is dealt with in LI. Any theorys account of the social world, or delimited parts of it, is based on a particular, albeit often implicit, conceptualisation of the agency-structure relationship and whether or not this conceptualisation is convincing impacts greatly on the quality of the theorys account of social phenomena and change. There is thus much to be learned about a theory, in this case LI, from examining its underlying assumptions with respect to agency and structure. This is even more so because appearances can be deceiving: as it will be argued in this article, LI which appears and is widely assumed to offer an agency-centred account of European integration, turns out to do the opposite on closer scrutiny. In addition to this introduction and a conclusion the article is divided into seven sections. The first two sections set the stage for later analyses by briefly introducing LI and the question of the agency-structure relationship, while also accounting for their respective significance. The following three sections examine how the agency-structure question is dealt with at each of the three stages of LI: preference formation, interstate bargaining and institutional choice. Against this background section six critically examines the liberal intergovernmentalist explanation of European integration before section seven discusses the political implications of LI. 1. Liberal Intergovernmentalism Andrew Moravcsiks Liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) was first presented in the early 1990s and later elaborated and applied in a string of publications of which the monumental book The Choice for Europe (1998) contains the most detailed exposition and test of the theory. LI is presented as a framework for synthesising theories into a coherent account of regional integration. The latter is explained as the result of ‘a series of celebrated intergovernmental bargains (Moravcsik, 1993: 473). More precisely integration is seen as the outcome of a three-stage process where: (1) national interests or goals arise in the context of domestic politics; (2) governments bargain with each other to further their national interest; and (3) governments make an institutional choice to secure credible commitment once a substantive agreement has been reached. LI quickly became a focal point in debates on how to theorise European integration and it has subsequently kept this position. According to Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig (2009: 67), LI ‘has acquired the status of a â€Å"baseline theory† in the study of regional integration: an essential first cut explanation against which other theories are often compared. In their view, ‘it has achieved this dominant status due to its theoretical soundness, empirical power, and utility as a foundation for synthesis with other explanations (2009: 67). To be sure, not everyone would agree with this latter sentiment. As alluded to in the introduction, several scholars have criticised the theory for painting a too incomplete or even misleading picture of the European integration process and the ‘empirical power of the resulting analyses has often been questioned (e.g. Diez, 1999; Smith, 2000; Wincott, 1995; see also Cini, 2007: 112-14 for an overview of some critiques of LI). In asmuch as relatively few scholars besides Moravcsik appear to wholeheartedly embrace LI (Pollack, 2001; however, cf. Laursen, 2002), it is probably fair to say that it has acquired its status as a â€Å"baseline theory† as much because of its perceived weaknesses as because of its strengths. Similar to Waltzs (1979) neorealism LI is a parsimonious and bold theory that lends itself to accusations of neglecting or underestimating the significance of important parameters in the case of LI for instance transnational business groups and activist supranational institutions. Indeed, LI does this deliberately, seeking ‘to simplify EU politics, stressing the essential and excluding certain secondary activities (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 2009: 68). Hereby it follows the neo-positivist recipe for theory construction, according to which theories should take the form of simplified models that can support efforts to make generalisations by singling out as few variables as possible and account for the causal relations between, and the relative weight of, these variables. Falsifiable hypothesises are derived from such theories and subsequently tested against reliable empirical data. On the basis of such tests, theories can then be further refined or occasionally discarded. (1 ) Testing LI is precisely what Moravcsik sets out to do in The Choice for Europe. Here standardised hypotheses derived from LI and competing (albeit for the most part artificial) theories are tested against an overwhelming amount of empirical data in five cases studies. Needless to say, LI comes out on top as the theory with the by far greatest explanatory power. More generally, The Choice for Europe constitutes an example par excellence of research informed by neo-positivist methods and standards. In its early pages Moravcsik informs his readership that the book ‘eschews ad hoc explanation and seeks instead to discover what is generalizable about EC history (1998: 2) and that it ‘is based on methods which, while far from ideal, generate more rigorous, transparent, objective, and reliable tests of competing theoretical claims about European integration than have heretofore been conducted (1998: 10). The bulk of studies of EC decision-making are criticised for biased data se lection and for relying on ‘citations to secondary sources themselves drawn from journalistic commentary or still other secondary sources (1998: 10). In contrast to this, Moravcsik claims to have backed ‘potentially controversial attribution of motive or strategy †¦ by â€Å"hard† primary sources (direct evidence of decision-making) rather than â€Å"soft† or secondary sources (1998: 10, see also pp. 80-84). (2) 2. Agency and structure The question of how to conceptualise the relationship between agency and structure is arguably one of the most important questions facing social scientists (Archer, 1995: 65). This is due to the importance of agency and structures in the social world and to the fact that it is impossible to offer explanations of events in the social world without appealing to some understanding of their relationship. As mentioned in the introduction there is thus much to be learned about the nature and quality of substantive theories from examining their underlying assumptions with respect to this relationship. Yet the way the latter is dealt with is also important for political reasons, to which we will come back in section 7 below. â€Å"Agency† denotes the ability of agents, whether individuals or groups, to act upon situations and it ‘implies a sense of free will, choice or autonomy that the actor could have behaved differently (Hay, 2002: 94). Agency should thus not be confused wit h concepts like â€Å"individuals†, â€Å"actors† or â€Å"agents†: without anticipating the conclusions of this article too much, a theory can refer to plenty of agents, while not allowing for any agency. â€Å"Structure†, on the other hand, refers to the relational context within which agents operate. Structures define the range of options available to agents. Nowadays the vast majority of scholars agree that both agency and structure matter: phenomena and developments in the social world issue not from either one or the other but are a product of both. If this is the case then it is necessary to break with the two ways of conceptualising the relation between agency and structure that have traditionally been dominant within social theory, namely structuralism and individualism. In their pure versions these positions either picture agents as marionettes (structuralism) or as omnipotent puppet-masters (individualism) (Archer, 1995; XXXXX). However, knowing that both agency and structure matter does not in itself take us far. To make a difference the insight needs to be incorporated into substantive theories and this is by no means an easy task. This contributes to explain why many theories end up offering reductionist explanations of the specific social phenomena they are meant to render intelligible. In the discipline of International Relations (IR) a debate over the â€Å"agent-structure problem† was initiated in the late 1980s by scholars such as Wendt (1987) and Hollis and Smith (1990). Later, and certainly no less interesting contributions to this debate included Doty (1997), Bieler and Morton (2001) and Wight (2006). The debate has done much to clarify and in many cases criticise the ontological and epistemological assumptions underlying mainstream IR theories, particularly Waltzian neorealism (Waltz, 1979). In EU Studies a similar debate has not taken place, and although in particular some constructivist scholars, have taken an interest in the agency-structure relationship (e.g. Wind, 2001), a comprehensive study of the way the most important theories of European integration and governance deal with it has yet to be published. However, it seems to be a widespread view among EU scholars that many of these theories privilege agency over structure. For instance, Risse ( 2004: 161) writes that the ‘prevailing theories of European integration whether neofunctionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism, or â€Å"multi-level governance† are firmly committed to a rationalist ontology which is agency-centred by definition. In a similar vein, other scholars have noticed ‘the ahistorical and structure-blind assumptions underlying intergovernmentalism (Hix, 1994: 9) and observed that in LI ‘agents are, implicitly or explicitly, considered primary actors ultimately determine the shape of overall structures (Christiansen, 1998: 103). In the next sections, the validity of this widespread view will be examined through an analysis of the way the agency-structure relationship is dealt with at each of the three stages in LI. 3. National preference formation The first stage in explaining the outcome of intergovernmental bargains is to account for the national preferences, which are defined as ‘an ordered and weighted set of values placed on future substantive outcomes †¦ that might result from international political interaction (Moravcsik, 1998: 24). This is done by means of a liberal political economy theory of preference formation, according to which national preferences arise in the context of domestic politics, where national government leaders form them on the basis of the preferences and actions of the most important societal groups. Most important among these are domestic producers: ‘The systematic political bias in favor of existing producer groups and against those, notably consumers, taxpayers, third-country producers, and also potential future producers, stems from the formers more intense, certain, and institutionally represented and organized interests (1998: 36). The state is conceptualised as ‘a rep resentative institution constantly subject to capture and recapture by societal groups (Moravcsik, 1997: 518). Because governments have an interest in remaining in office, they need the support from coalitions of domestic actors. The policies pursued by governments are ‘therefore constrained by the underlying identities, interests, and power of individuals and groups †¦ who constantly pressure the central decision makers to pursue politics consistent with their preferences (ibid: 518). In other words, ‘[g]roups articulate preferences; governments aggregate them and it is through this process that ‘the set of national interests or goals that states bring to international negotiations emerges (Moravcsik, 1993: 483). To evaluate the way the agency-structure relationship is dealt with at this stage in LI it is clearly crucial to understand the origins of the preferences of societal groups. Some of the early critics of LI suggested that the theory fails to account adequately for this. For instance, it was pointed out that ‘the origins of such interests are exogenized (Risse-Kappen, 1996: 56) while others claimed that in LI ‘interests are not structurally derived (Caporaso and Keeler, 1995: 44) and even that they ‘emerge mysteriously (McSweeney, 1998: 101). Had it in fact been the case that LI leaves completely open the question of where the preferences of societal groups come from it would have allowed for an agency-centred perspective on preference formation. That is, preferences could have been formed on the basis of all sorts of ideas and individual inclinations. However, this would have seriously undermined the parsimony and explanatory power of the theory and hence it was in fact never left open where preferences come from. As Moravcsik has made clear, LI perceives preferences to be directly caused by structural circumstances, more precisely economic structures: ‘I employ a structural theory of those preferences. My structural approach†¦employs trade flows, competitiveness, inflation rates, and other data to predict what the economic preferences of societal actors and therefore governments should be (Moravcsik, 1999b: 377). In other words, economic preferences are derived from economic structures: societal groups organise and articulate their preferences ‘on the basis of calculations of net expected costs and benefits resulting from the introduction of new policies (Moravcsik, 1993: 489). It follows as a logical implication that ‘shifts in preferences should follow the onset and precede the resolution of shifts or trends in economic circumstances (Moravcsik, 1998: 50). The assumption that economic structures translate directly into specific preferences is made possible by the rationality assumption underpinning LI. The widespread view that LI is agency-centred is related to this assumption that individuals, groups, governments and even states are rational. This begs the question of what â€Å"rationalism† precisely entails, especially as some scholars have suggested that Moravcsik fails to spell this clearly out (Christiansen et al., 2001: 4). In a recent piece Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig (2009: 68) put it as follows: ‘Rationalism is an individualist or agency assumption. Actors calculate the alternative courses of action and choose the one that maximizes (or satisfies) their utility under the circumstances. Collective outcomes are explained as the result of aggregated individual actions based on efficient pursuit albeit subject to the information at hand and uncertainty about the future. Despite the qualifications at the end of the quote it is clear that whatever this uncertainty pertains to it is not to the consequences of the actions of agents: agents are assumed to be very well-informed about these because, as Moravcsik has put it himself, in ‘a world in which the future consequences of actions are unknown †¦ LI would make little sense (1995: 626). This is an important manifestation, because the more it is assumed that agents know the future consequences of their actions, the more it must also be assumed that they are fully informed about the context in which they currently find themselves. It is quite simply logically inconceivable that an agent can somehow know the future consequences of his or her actions without having perfect or very close to perfect information at hand at the moment of the action itself. Moravcsik is thus significantly underplaying the strength of his rationality assumption when stating that ‘it takes no position on whether states are fully informed, though a framework in which states are assumed to be informed generally performs well (1998: 23). Why not walk the plank? Surely states and other agents can safely be assumed to be blessed full information if it has already been established that no or very few unintended consequences will follow from their actions? At the end of the day the rationality assumption boils down to the view that agents are utility-maximisers with clearly ordered preferences who are (almost?) fully informed, also about the future consequences of actions. However, it should not be concluded from this that LI is an agency-centred theory as the conventional wisdom has it. As we have seen above, preferences are derived from economic structures not just in the weak sense that structures are important in relation to preferences but in the strong sense that they alone dictate preferences (albeit with a minor qualification to which we will return in a moment). Because the rational agents are assumed to be so well-informed their actions become predictable once their structural environment has been mapped. Indeed, only structures matter here inasmuch as ‘[p]references are by definition causally independent of the strategies of other actors (Moravcsik, 1997: 519, see also 1998: 24-25). Moreover, ideas are for the most part not allowed to play any role in relation to preference formation. It is worth dwelling on this for a moment. On one hand, Moravcsik does not hesitate to acknowledge the importance of ideas, as when he proclaims that they ‘are like oxygen or language; it is essentially impossible for humans to function without them (Moravcsik, 2001: 229). On the other hand, ideas do not play a very prominent role in LI, which is also recognized by Moravcsik when he writes that ‘[i]n the LI account of integration, ideas are present but not causally central. They may be irrelevant or random, or, more likely, they are â€Å"transmission belts† for interests (Moravcsik, 2001: 229). The only reason why Moravcsik can correctly maintain that in LI ‘[s]ome national preferences are grounded in ideas (1998: 23) is because some importance is ascribed to the latter in issue areas where the material consequences of policy initiatives are more or less impossible to calculate. For instance, he mentions ‘questions of European institutions and common foreign policy as issues where governments/states will generally not to be under strong pressure from societal groups to pursue particular policies, which creates some room for government leaders to act on the basis of ‘ideologies and personal commitments (Moravcsik, 1993: 494; see also Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 2009: 85). According to Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig (2009: 76), ‘LI best explains policy-making in issue areas where social preferences are relatively certain and well defined. In the core areas, like trade, agriculture and monetary policy, ideas are not assumed to influence preference formation at all. When it comes to ‘insignificant, exceptional and speculative issues like those mentioned above or the Open Method of Coordination (ibid.: 85) where the preferences of societal groups are less clear and strong, and where the explanatory power of LI is thus recognised to be limited, ideas are conveniently allowed to play a role. To recapitulate, in LI no importance is ascribed to ideas in the explanation of what is (correctly) considered to be the ‘substantively important issues (ibid.: 85) in the European integration process: here economic structures do the job alone. (3) 4. International bargains Once the national preferences have been formulated, national decision-makers bring them to the intergovernmental bargaining table. At this second stage LI applies an intergovernmentalist bargaining theory in order to explain the outcome of negotiations. As the primary interest of the governments is to remain in office, they have a clear incentive to defend the national interest in the negotiation. Accordingly, ‘[t]he configuration of domestically determined national preferences defines a â€Å"bargaining space† of potentially viable agreements (Moravcsik, 1993: 496-497). The outcome of a concrete negotiation, however, not only reflects the different national preferences but also the relative bargaining power of different states. Moravcsik defines power in terms of asymmetric interdependence: ‘Bargaining leverage stems most fundamentally from asymmetries in the relative intensity of national preferences, which reflect †¦ the relative costs of agreements to remo ve negative externalities (ibid.: 1993: 499). This means that ‘[t]he power of each government is inversely proportional to the relative value that it places on an agreement (Moravcsik, 1998: 62). How, then, is the agency-structure relationship dealt with at this second stage? Or to put it differently: how much freedom does government leaders have to pursue their own preferences or ideas (agency) and how much are they constrained by their context (structure)? First, the answer to this question depends on the issue area. As mentioned, governments are severely constrained by domestic societal groups in core areas: here they can only act within a narrow â€Å"bargaining space† which limits their freedom considerably. In more marginal (non-economic) issue areas this space widens and government leaders enjoy more freedom to pursue their own agendas. Second, any particular government is constrained by the bargaining spaces of other governments. The nature of these determines the extent to which a government leader is capable of realising national interests. Finally, the outcomes of previous bargains serve as the status quo ‘with respect to which societal actors and gove rnments calculate preferences and alternatives to agreement (Moravcsik, 1995: 612). As mentioned above, the outcome of a concrete bargain reflects the relative bargaining power of each state. As bargaining power is defined in terms of asymmetric interdependence it is, in fact, derived from the very same structures as national preferences. These structures determine how attractive a potential policy is to societal groups and thus governments and consequently they also determine the relative bargaining power. Relative power is thus ultimately decided at the structural level not at the level of agents. This brings us back to the point that was raised in the previous section, namely that the rationality assumption underpinning LI does not serve to render it an agency-centred theory. To be sure, there are plenty of agents in LI, and there is no denying that the theory belongs to the tradition of â€Å"methodological individualism†. But by substituting real agents with ‘calculating machines who always know what they want and are never uncertain about the f uture and even their own stakes and interests (Risse, 2009: 147), LI effectively ends up with no notion of agency at all, at least not in its account of integration in core issue areas. That it is apparently unnecessary to study the interaction between state representatives in order to explain the outcome of a bargain tells it all: the creativity, charisma, persuasiveness and negotiating abilities of particular agents are insignificant in LI. By assuming that agents are identical in the sense of being rational it is possible to derive the outcome of bargains simply by looking at the context in which it takes place. This makes LI a structuralist theory also in its second stage. To be sure, the structuralism of LI differs from conventional structuralism inasmuch as the former retains a focus on agents and their free choices. But the point is that the â€Å"methodological individualism† of LI and other rational choice theories does not entail a genuine notion of agency in that a free choice is neither free nor, indeed, a real choice, if it is always already given by the context in which the agent operates (see also Hay, 2002: 103-104; Tsebelis, 1990: 40). (4) 5. Institutional choice Once governments have reached substantive agreement in a bargain, they set up institutional arrangements in order to secure it. At this third stage LI adopts a functional theory of institutional choice according to which governments pool or delegate authority in order to ‘constrain and control one another (Moravcsik, 1998: 9). Authority is â€Å"pooled† when governments for instance agree to take decisions in an issue area by means of qualified majority voting in the Council, whereas â€Å"delegation† refers to the transfer of authority to more or less autonomous supranational institutions (ibid.: 1998: 67). Pooling and delegation are ‘viewed as solutions to the problem of â€Å"incomplete contracting,† which arises when member governments share broad goals but find it too costly or technically impossible to specify all future contingencies involved in legislating or enforcing those goals (ibid.: 1998: 73). By pooling or delegating, the credibility of the commitment to the substantive agreement that has been reached is enhanced. But by giving up authority in an issue area governments clearly run the risk of being either outvoted by other governments (pooling) or of being overruled by supranational institutions (delegation) in future cases. Hence, ‘[t]he specific level of pooling or delegation reflects a reciprocal cost-benefit analysis: governments renounce unilateral options in order to assure that all governments will coordinate their behavior in particular ways (ibid.: 1998: 75). LI predicts that pooling and delegation will vary across issues and countries. Again, the preferences of societal groups are crucial: ‘Governments transfer sovereignty to commit other governments to accept policies favored by key domestic constituencies (ibid.: 1998: 76). As accounted for above the preferences of societal groups are seen as structurally determined, at least in the core issue area s. In the end the governments institutional choices thus become rather mechanical, following more or less automatically from the circumstances in which they are made. According to LI, international institutions are ‘passive, transaction-cost reducing sets of rules (Moravcsik, 1993: 508) that for instance serve to provide states with information ‘to reduce the states uncertainty about each others future preferences and behaviour (Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 2009: 72). Somewhat surprisingly, Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig link the existence of such institutions to â€Å"unanticipated consequences† of actions, proclaiming that LI also assumes the existence of the latter: ‘If unanticipated consequences did not exist, there would be no need for international institutions to elaborate â€Å"incomplete contracts† to begin with. The reason for institutions is precisely to elaborate agreements and credibly lock in compliance against defection by future unsatisfied governments (2009: 75). This, to be sure, is a somewhat unorthodox and problematic use of the concept. When, for instance, historical institutionalists are talking about unintended or unanticipated consequences in the context of European integration, their argument is that supranational institutions and policies tend to develop in ways not originally envisaged and subsequently not approved of by member state governments (Pierson, 1996). Due to â€Å"path dependency† and other mechanisms such institutions and the course of the integration process can become impossible for governments to control. Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig clearly have something altogether different in mind when they talk about unanticipated consequences. In fact, what they are talking about can more accurately be denoted ‘anticipated but undesired outcomes. These arise when rational governments anticipate that there is a risk that other rational governments will not comply with the substantive agreement that has been reached in an intergovernmental bargain. To avoid this undesired outcome governments agree on an institutional arrangement to create certainty. On this view, institutions (being ‘passive, transaction-cost reducing sets of rules) only contribute to minimise uncertainty by eliminating the risk of undesired outcomes (see also Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig, 2009: 72) it is unthinkable that they can develop and behave in ways not intended by governments. At the end of the day, it is not unintended consequences that LI assumes the existence of but rather the ability of governments to ver y accurately predict the consequences of their substantive agreement and on this basis chose the most suitable institutional agreements. This dubious assumption can obviously only be made if it is held, as LI does, that agents are blessed with more or less perfect information, also of future outcomes of their actions (see also Pierson, 2004: 115-XXX). 6. What choice for Europe? ‘the motivations and coalitions underlying national preferences in specific decisions reflected the economic interest of sectors as predicted by their structural position in global markets †¦ any feedback must take the form of changes in economic structures, not ideas (Moravcsik, 1999b: 382) The liberal intergovernmentalist explanation of regional integration ultimately comes down to developments in economic structures and it is therefore logical and appropriate that Moravcsik (1998: 501) refers to it as a ‘structural perspective. Although the concept of â€Å"economic structures† is not defined as clearly as other LI concepts, it basically appears to denote the phenomena that economic indicators are expressions of, examples being trade flows, inflation rates, wealth and competitiveness. The method is thus to use economic indicators as expressions of the economic structures determining the preferences of agents. For instance it reads that ‘Taken together, capital mobility, trade flows, and inflationary convergence provide a prima facie explanation of the progressive shift in national preferences away from, then back toward, exchange-rate cooperation over the two decades following the collapse of the Bretton Woods. This period saw an increase in economic openness and, beginning in the late 1970s, convergence toward low inflation (Moravcsik, 1998: 48) But what caused this and other shifts in economic circumstances? What explains the timing of such shifts? Considering the enormous importance it ascribes to economic structures it would be completely reasonable to expect LI to address and tentatively provide a theoretical answer to such questions. But it doesnt! In all fairness, Moravcsik

Should Governments Sponsor Gambling?

Should Governments Sponsor Gambling? The government is now sponsoring gambling to raise revenues. By 2002 government-sponsored gambling brought in 11 billion dollars! â€Å"Winning means a life of luxury and happiness,† is only one of the many slogans the government uses to advertise gambling. Gambling has a lot of pros as to the economy and employing more citizens but it has a lot of cons as well. Should governments sponsor gambling? The answer is no! Governments should not sponsor gambling because it is a total money grab, it feeds gambling addictions, and it destroys families and exploits Canadian citizens.Gambling can be an expensive waste of time. Gambling is a complete money grab. Statistics show that the average household spends about $300 per year on gaming. The chances of winning the lottery are slim to none. The government promise a greater life if you win, but with chances that are extremely low, it is highly unrealistic. Gambling is a form of entertainment that giv es you hope for something. This can be dangerous as it can lead to over spending or dull judgement. Alcohol is mostly always associated with gambling.This can add to the high expense and even sway your choice to spend more and more. Many people say that the government should not sponsor an activity that can be strongly addictive. Statistics show that 3. 1 percent of Ontario’s population are Problem gamblers. â€Å"Ontario derives a huge portion of it's gaming revenue from problem gambler's. Therefore, government-sponsored gambling is contrary to the interest of the general populace, and therefore contrary to the purpose of the government. † Robert Williams, University of Lethbridge, Alberta, November 2004 .Government sponsored gambling feeds an unhealthy addiction that many people can have. These addictions can lead to theft and even suicide. Gambling is just like any other addiction, it completely takes over the person's life. This can affect your family and marriage. Always being at the slots or casino's funded by the government can make you lose quality time with your family. It can financially hurt you and hurt your family in the long run. Government-sponsored gambling is causing problems with your person life. It will exploit you for more and more money.It constantly brain washes you with it's advertisement of the amazing times you will have and how much better your life will be. This is not true. These people chase their losses by risking more money, thinking that somehow persistence will pay off. It rarely does. They suffer from depression, anxiety, financial and family breakdown. Governments should not sponsor gambling. It is a big money grab, it is highly addictive, and it can tear apart families. Gambling has an ill affect towards canadian citizens. The government says gambling is a form of entertainment.With such a low chance of winning, how is loosing money fun? In gambling, many people inherit a sense of hope. The small chance that y ou might win and go out with more money than you came with. This is an unlogical probability but, everyone is driven by this hope that they might win. Gambling does bring a lot of jobs and boosts our economy, but the problem to balance responsible gambling with generating profits to the economy. Impossible maybe but, better efforts have to be made so that gambling doesn’t take over canadians.

Accreditation and Private Prisons Essay

According to the American Correctional Association website, accreditation can be define as â€Å"a system of verification that correctional agencies/facilities comply with national standards promulgated by the American Correctional Association† (â€Å"Standards & Accreditation†, n.d.). In order to achieve accreditation, it must go through reviews, appraisals, analysis, and hearings first. For a correctional agency to be accepted for accreditation, they at least must have one of the following: â€Å"pretrial or presented adult or juveniles; convicted adults or juveniles adjudicated delinquent; and/or adult or juvenile offenders sentenced to community supervision† (â€Å"Standards & Accreditation†, n.d.). There are many advantages and benefits of accreditation. The benefits have shown assessments of facilities’ strength and weaknesses, shown goals obtained, implantation of policies and procedures, established specific guidelines for everyday procedure, â€Å"aid in the defense of frivolous lawsuits, and increase of community support and a higher level of staff professionalism and morale† (â€Å"Standards & Accreditation†, n.d.). See more: Strategic Management Process Essay At ACA, they believe accreditation can enhance staff and development training. While though accreditation, there will be transcribe policies and agendas to help designate a training and staff development. The program will be for all levels of personnel. Employees’ experiences will automatically grow throughout all the training related to their job-related positions. They will receive current job-related training in relation to position requirements, new theories, current correctional issues, techniques and technologies. With the professional trainings, correctional officers will work toward compliance with standards which represent a professional practice. After all their hard work through the training, they will take pride in their professionalism. Through the ACA and the accreditation process, corrections has become more respected as a profession. They apply evidence-based practices which provide safe, secure, and humane conditions of confinement for over the millions of prisoners confined in this country. There are many valuable insights the Association provides about criminal justice and correctional policies to legislatures and government officials (Hamden, 2006-2013). Privatization are private sector prison used to hold prisoners. It is one of the solution used to solve the overcrowding of prisoners. With private prisons, it can help reduce the cost of incarcerating prisoners in an overcrowding prison (Joel, 2013). During the past couple of decades, prison population has increase. To solve this problem, it would require higher taxes on the people to build more prisons. The people responded by refusing to pay higher taxes to the government to build more prisons. Unable to solve the overcrowding of prison, a solution occurred to build private prisons to decrease overcrowding prisons. During the mid-1980s, private business interests saw the overcrowding prison as a profit and a way to expand their businesses. Corrections Corporation of America, the first modern private business was the first to emerge and established itself in 1984. The contract for the facility in Hamilton County, Tennessee was awarded to Corrections Corporation of America (CCA). It was the first time any government in the country to ever contract the entire jail operation to a private operator (Smith, 1996-2013). Privatization of prisons is thought to be more cost-effective and more efficient than public prisons (Smith, 1996-2013). Through some research to doubt on these claims, evidence show private prisons did not live up to its expectations. Research showed private prisons were no different from public prisons. In private prisons, lower staff and training may likely increase incidents of violence and escapes. With a nationwide study conducted, assaults on prison guards by inmates occur more frequently than in government-run prisons (Smith, 1996-2013). The study also show inmates assaulting other inmates occurred more often in private prisons. Concerning private vs. public prisons, there is no comparison between the two. Private prisons does not exactly help reduce the cost in public prisons. With few staffing and increase of proper training, it is likely to have more problems in private prisons than public prisons.

Heap vs. Stack for Delphi Developers

Call the function DoStackOverflow once from your code and youll get the EStackOverflow error raised by Delphi with the message stack overflow. ​function DoStackOverflow : integer;begin result : 1 DoStackOverflow;end; What is this stack and why there is an overflow there using the code above? So, the DoStackOverflow function is recursively calling itself -- without an exit strategy -- it just keeps on spinning and never exits. A quick fix, you would do, is to clear the obvious bug you have, and ensure the function exists at some point (so your code can continue executing from where you have called the function). You move on, and you never look back, not caring about the bug/exception as it is now solved. Yet, the question remains: what is this stack and why is there an overflow? Memory in Your Delphi Applications When you start programming in Delphi, you might experience bug like the one above, you would solve it and move on. This one is related to memory allocation. Most of the time you would not care about memory allocation as long as you free what you create. As you gain more experience in Delphi, you start creating your own classes, instantiate them, care about memory management and alike. You will get to the point where you will read, in the Help, something like Local variables (declared within procedures and functions) reside in an applications stack. and also Classes are reference types, so they are not copied on assignment, they are passed by reference, and they are allocated on the heap. So, what is stack and what is heap? Stack vs. Heap Running your application on Windows, there are three areas in the memory where your application stores data: global memory, heap, and stack. Global variables (their values/data) are stored in the global memory. The memory for global variables is reserved by your application when the program starts and remains allocated until your program terminates. The memory for global variables is called data segment. Since global memory is only once allocated and freed at program termination, we do not care about it in this article. Stack and heap are where dynamic memory allocation takes place: when you create a variable for a function, when you create an instance of a class when you send parameters to a function and use/pass its result value. What Is Stack? When you declare a variable inside a function, the memory required to hold the variable is allocated from the stack. You simply write var x: integer, use x in your function, and when the function exits, you do not care about memory allocation nor freeing. When the variable goes out of scope (code exits the function), the memory which was taken on the stack is freed. The stack memory is allocated dynamically using the LIFO (last in first out) approach. In Delphi programs, stack memory is used by Local routine (method, procedure, function) variables.Routine parameters and return types.Windows API function calls.Records (this is why you do not have to explicitly create an instance of a record type). You do not have to explicitly free the memory on the stack, as the memory is auto-magically allocated for you when you, for example, declare a local variable to a function. When the function exits (sometimes even before due to Delphi compiler optimization) the memory for the variable will be auto-magically freed. Stack memory size is, by default, large enough for your (as complex as they are) Delphi programs. The Maximum Stack Size and Minimum Stack Size values on the Linker options for your project specify default values -- in 99.99% you would not need to alter this. Think of a stack as a pile of memory blocks. When you declare/use a local variable, Delphi memory manager will pick the block from the top, use it, and when no longer needed it will be returned back to the stack. Having local variable memory used from the stack, local variables are not initialized when declared. Declare a variable var x: integer in some function and just try reading the value when you enter the function -- x will have some weird non-zero value. So, always initialize (or set value) to your local variables before you read their value. Due to LIFO, stack (memory allocation) operations are fast as only a few operations (push, pop) are required to manage a stack. What Is  Heap? A heap is a region of memory in which dynamically allocated memory is stored. When you create an instance of a class, the memory is allocated from the heap. In Delphi programs, heap memory is used by/when Creating an instance of a class.Creating and resizing dynamic arrays.Explicitly allocating memory using GetMem, FreeMem, New and Dispose().Using ANSI/wide/Unicode strings, variants, interfaces (managed automatically by Delphi). Heap memory has no nice layout where there would be some order is allocating blocks of memory. Heap looks like a can of marbles. Memory allocation from the heap is random, a block from here than a block from there. Thus, heap operations are a bit slower than those on the stack. When you ask for a new memory block (i.e. create an instance of a class), Delphi memory manager will handle this for you: youll get a new memory block or a used and discarded one. The heap consists of all virtual memory (RAM and disk space). Manually Allocating Memory Now that all about memory is clear, you can safely (in most cases) ignore the above and simply continue writing Delphi programs as you did yesterday. Of course, you should be aware of when and how to manually allocate/free memory. The EStackOverflow (from the beginning of the article) was raised because with each call to DoStackOverflow a new segment of memory has been used from the stack and stack has limitations. As simple as that.